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Background: Even though the use of perioperative checklists have resulted in significant reduction in
postoperative mortality and morbidity, as well as improvements of important information communication, the
utilization of checklists seems to vary, and perceived barriers are likely to influence compliance. In this grounded
theory study we aimed to explore the challenges and strategies of performing the WHO’s Safe Surgical Checklist as
experienced by the nurses appointed as checklist coordinators.
Methods: Grounded theory was used in gathering and analyzing data from observations of the checklist used in
the operating room, in conjunction with single and focus group interviews. A purposeful sample of 14
nurse-anesthetists and operating room nurses as surgical team members in a tertiary teaching hospital participated
in the study.
Results: The nurses’ main concern regarding checklist utilization was identified as “how to obtain professional and
social acceptance within the team”. The emergent grounded theory of “adjusting team involvement” consisted of
three strategies; distancing, moderating and engaging team involvement. The use of these strategies explains how
they resolved their challenges. Each strategy had corresponding conditions and consequences, determining
checklist compliance, and how the checklist was used.
Conclusion: Even though nurses seem to have a loyal attitude towards the WHO’s checklist regarding their task
work, they adjusted their surgical team involvement according to practical, social and professional conditions in
their work environment. This might have resulted in the incomplete use of the checklist and therefore a low
compliance rate. Findings also emphasized the importance of: a) management support when implementing WHO’s
Safe Surgical Checklist, and b) interprofessional education approach to local adaptation of the checklists use.Background
Providing healthcare is inherently interdisciplinary, in-
volving physicians, nurses and allied health professionals
from different specialties. It is widely recognized in pa-
tient safety literature that team performance is crucial in
providing safe patient care [1] and that many of the fac-
tors contributing to adverse events in healthcare, origin-
ate from flawed teamwork, rather than from lack of
clinical skills [2,3]. Various factors affecting the quality* Correspondence: hilde.valen.wehle@helse-bergen.no
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orand safety of patient care have been identified as poor
communication, poor coordination, lack of understand-
ing of roles and shared goals for patient care between
the professional groups, limited sharing of information
between team members, disagreements, and aggressions
[4-6]. Thus teamwork has been addressed as a key factor
in system-based interventions to improve patient safety
and medical education standards [4].
In 2008 the World Health Organization launched the
Safe Surgical Checklist [7] and great efforts are being
made on its implementation in hospitals around the
world. However, there is an ongoing debate in leading
medical journals as to whether a technical solution suchLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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care, whilst effective teamwork per se is more crucial to
providing safe patient care, and teamwork must be dis-
tinguished from task work [8]. The relationship between
culture change, improved coordination and reduction of
errors has been well established from research in the avi-
ation industry [9]. However, even though a checklist
might be a feasible and efficient tool that promotes operat-
ing room (OR) team cohesion and information exchange
[9-11], the attitudes of personnel involved towards check-
lists may vary, and attitudes and experiences are likely to
influence compliance [12]. The second Global Patient
Safety Challenge aimed to improve surgical outcomes for
all patients, and ten basic essential objectives for any sur-
gical case were compiled into the WHO’s Surgical Safety
Checklist. According to the WHO’s implementation man-
ual, the checklist provides a tool for two purposes: enab-
ling consistency in safety for patients, and introducing and
maintaining a culture that values achieving it [7].
Implementation of the WHO’s “Safe Surgical Checklist”
in all surgical units at corresponding hospitals, was
initiated by the Western Norway Regional Health Author-
ity (WNRHA) in 2009. The checklist was translated to
Norwegian by the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the
Health Services and the WNRHA’s Safe Surgery study
group. In 2009-2011 this Norwegian version was intro-
duced to all members of the surgical team [nurse anesthe-
tists, consulting anesthetists, anesthesiologists, chief- and
consultants of surgery, and operating room nurses] includ-
ing the heads of the different surgical departments, and
implemented in all surgical units at this University
Hospital. In each unit the checklist contents were revised
twice, based on feedback from the users during the first
three month period.
Performing the WHO’s checklist
In accordance with the WHO implementation manual, a
checklist coordinator was appointed for each of the
three different parts of the checklist; the nurse
anesthetist before induction of anesthesia (Sign In), and
the operating room (OR) nurse before skin incision
(Time Out) and before the patient leaves the operating
room (Sign Out) [7]. The responsibility of coordinating
the checklist utilization was thus left exclusively to the
nursing profession.
Sign in
Before induction of anesthesia, the nurse anesthetist
should verbally confirm with the patient his or her iden-
tity, the surgical site and the procedure being performed.
If appropriate, a visual confirmation that the operative
site had been marked should follow. The nurse
anesthetist should verbally review with the anesthesia
professionals and the circulating nurse the patient’s riskof blood loss, airway difficulties and allergies, and also
whether a safety check of the anesthesia machine and
medications has been completed.
Time out
In this phase the entire team should pause immediately
before the skin incision to confirm out loud that the cor-
rect operation is being performed on the correct patient
and on the correct site. All team members should then
verbally review with one another, in turn, the critical ele-
ments of their plan for the operation, using the checklist
questions for guidance. They should also confirm that
prophylactic antibiotics have been administered within
the previous 60 minutes, and that essential imaging is
displayed as appropriate.
Sign out
In the last phase, the team should review together the
operation that has been performed. This includes com-
pletion of sponge and instrument counts and the label-
ing of any surgical specimens obtained. They should also
review key plans and concerns for postoperative man-
agement and recovery before moving the patient from
the operating room.
In a study by Høyland and colleagues, nurses were
largely in favor of the checklist and looked upon it as a
platform to improve communication and clarify needs
required for the surgical procedure [13]. Furthermore,
Vats et al. found that the steep hierarchy of the surgical
team served as a barrier to nurses being checklist coordi-
nators, yet the nursing teams have taken on the responsi-
bility of ensuring consistent use of the checklist [12]. To
understand interactions among the personnel, and hence
the context or setting in which people address a problem
or an issue, there is a need to conceptualize the behavior
and work role perceptions of the nurses, conducted with a
qualitative study [14]. By using a grounded theory
approach we therefore aimed to explore the nurse anesthe-
tists and operating room nurses’ challenges and strategies
used when utilizing the WHO’s checklist.
Methods
Grounded theory is a qualitative, systematic approach used
to explore processes in the context of situated interaction,
with an embedded focus on human action and interac-
tions, and involves the concurrent collection and analysis
of data to formulate theories that are grounded in the
world of the participants [15-17]. The intent of this
research method is to move beyond description, and to
generate or discover a theory that explains the situated
actions and interactions as they experience, engage with,
and manage the phenomenon of study. This is done by
focusing on the main concern or problem that the indivi-
duals’ behavior is designed to resolve [15-17]. The goal of
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hence the social processes that explain how people con-
tinually resolve it. The main concern or problem must be
discovered from the data.
Participants and setting
The study was conducted using a combination of meth-
ods including observation, a single interview with an OR
nurse and focus group interviews of operating room
nurses and nurse anesthetists. With an inductive per-
spective, the focus group interview guide was developed
based on the observation of the nurses’ utilization of the
WHO’s Safe Surgical Checklist. The study was carried
out at a tertiary hospital in the Western part of Norway.
The hospital has 1,100 beds, 12,000 employees and is a
referral hospital for 600,000 inhabitants with a surgical
volume of 25,000 operations annually. The Safe Surgical
Checklist had been routinely used for nine months. The
venue of the observation was at the hospital’s central
operating theatre in a neurosurgical operating room.
The operating teams consisted of two surgeons, three
operating room nurses, one anesthesiologist and two
nurse anesthetists. The Safe Surgical Checklist utilization
was the object of the observation. The operating team
and patients were sampled in permission with the unit
management. Nurse anesthetists and OR nurses were
recruited into focus group interviews in collaboration
with the unit management. The first focus group inter-
view included three nurse anesthetists and the second
group interview included three OR nurses. Based on the
findings in the analysis of the first two interviews, we
conducted a single interview with one OR nurse to val-
idate the process of the emerging theory [15-17]. The
composition of the two last focus groups was designed
purposefully, consisting equally of both two nurse
anesthetists and two OR nurses, due to the emerging
conceptualization. The inclusion criteria was having
experience with the WHO’s checklist performance over
a 9-12 month period. Out of 14 nurses (n = 14) two were
male, and the range of work practice experience in the
OR varied from 1-29 years.
Data collection
The observation of the checklist in use took place in the
OR where the nurses performed their daily work, and
covered one operation, one team and their use of the
checklist in the OR for one day. A total of four focus
group interviews were combined with one single inter-
view. In grounded theory, collecting data is not envi-
sioned as a single, unidirectional line, but its process is
guided by the developing grounded theory [15-17].
Observational data was noted during and immediately
after the observed operation. The notes were subsequently
analyzed and were inherently the basis for development ofthe focus group interview guide [Additional file 1], and
validation of interviewer’s role.
The observation and the interviews were conducted
over a time period of four months.
Each of the four focus group interviews lasted 45-60
minutes and the single interview lasted 40 minutes. A
nurse, trained as a moderator, assisted in two of the four
focus group interviews. To initiate free discussion open
ended questions were used, and the interviews were con-
ducted in hospital localities free of disturbance [14]. The
two first focus group interviews were carried out using the
first version of the interview guide, whereas an edited
interview guide was used to conduct the last three inter-
views. All interviews had the same opening question: “Can
you tell me what it has been like, using the WHO’s “Safe
Surgery Checklist?” While the first interview guide focused
on barriers and motivators when using the checklists in
general, the second interview guide focused on the chal-
lenges reflecting conditions and adaptive processes to-
wards specific parts of the checklist. All interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim. In accordance to the
grounded theory, each transcript was analyzed before the
next interview. Sampling was controlled by the emerging
theory as in theoretical sampling, according to Glaser,
1978 [16].Data analysis
The transcripts were analyzed using the constant com-
parative method: each interview was analyzed and com-
pared to the previous interview combined with written
textual notes from the checklist observation in a continu-
ous process [15-17]. In accordance with grounded theory
methodology, an open coding was performed manually
line-by-line, by the first author, constantly focusing on the
incidents: the meaning, action, and interaction of “what is
actually going on in the area studied”. The nurses’ main
concern was identified after the observation in the OR
and the performance of two focus group interviews and
one single interview. The last two focus group sessions
were held to ensure variety in the data-material, and to
enrich the emerging codes and hypotheses. Saturation in
data was achieved after analyzing the fourth focus group
interview, and the study progressed to identify patterns of
behavior by which the nurses resolved their concern.
Examples of an open coding from data are presented in
Additional file 2: Table S1. The codes were subsequently
grouped into broader, tractable categories, and further into
more extensive, universal categories, thereby translating
the descriptive concepts until theoretical saturation was
obtained [15-17]. During the whole process of analysis;
memos, theoretical ideas about codes, categories and their
relationships were written and used in the analysis. When
the core category was identified, it was finally compared
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see if the findings were supported [17].
Trustworthiness
To ensure trustworthiness of the study and its findings,
verbatim transcription, constant comparison, and persist-
ent and prolonged engagement with the data were used
[14]. Peer debriefing sessions as described in Creswell,
2007, were also held to provide an external check of the
research process [14]. This involved health care profes-
sionals from both the hospital and the local University
College. Assessing the quality of grounded theories
requires analyzing the criteria of fit, work, relevance and
modifiability [15-17]. That is, the theory fits the data, and
works to explain the variation within the data set. “Discov-
ered” like this, a grounded theory will fit empirical situa-
tions. The notion of work means that theories should
provide predictions, explanations and interpretations of
what is going on in the area under study. Relevance
implies that theories should be relevant to action in the
area it purported to explain, focusing on the emerged core
problems and processes. The notion of modifiabilitymeans
that a grounded theory might go through changes when
new data emerge, generating qualifications to the theory
[15-17]. Our data came from Norway, from a hospital in
which the checklist had been in use for a 9-12 month
period, but without a systematic evaluation of its use.
Studying the nurses appointed as checklist coordinators
would therefore probably provide valuable predictions and
explanations of the checklist usage.
Ethics
This study was not undertaken by Norwegian law
according to the Committee for Medical Research Ethics
of the Western Health Region of Norway. Approval for
this study was given by hospital management and the
data privacy Ombudsman at the tertiary teaching hos-
pital involved. All respondents gave their informed con-
sent to participate in the interviews. The patients and
personnel present at the OR during the utilization of the
checklist also gave informed consent.
Results
The participants’ main concern is seen as both the cause
and motivation for their actions [15-17]. It was therefore
essential to capture this. The nurses’ main concern was
identified as “how to obtain professional and social ac-
ceptance within the team”, which seemed to be existen-
tially contingent in their pre-existing environmental
context in addition to performing the checklist. Conse-
quences of the actions performed by the nurses, con-
sciously or not, to gain recognition from the team, were
however characterized by how they related to both their
task work and the teamwork in the OR, including thesocial interaction among the surgical team members
caused by the checklist. The emergent grounded theory
of “adjusting team involvement” explained how they
resolved their challenge. Adjusting team involvement
consisted of three strategies: distancing, moderating, and
engaging social and professional team involvement. Each
strategy had corresponding conditions and conse-
quences, which determined checklist compliance, and
how the checklist was used. The strategies also varied
according to the different phases of the checklist, and
the team compositions. The nurses directed their strat-
egies according to their professional role, relations with
the team members, and to their activities in the OR. The
three different strategies are presented in Additional
file 3: Table S2 with their corresponding conditions and
consequences.
Distancing team involvement
Conditions of this strategy were mainly characterized by
uncertainty and lack of consensus as to when, where, in
which situations, and in what types of surgery the check-
list was to be used. This caused frustration among the
nurses, and many of them expressed a need for adminis-
trative guidelines, and management commitment regard-
ing the implementation of the checklist. They also
seemed to struggle in preparing for the scheduled proce-
dures with limited time available, thus regarding the
checklist as another task they “had to do”. A consider-
able resistance in the team towards checklist use was
also experienced by the nurses. This resistance was
expressed verbally in an active ridiculing manner, and
non-verbally in a more ignorant manner.
“If the surgeon is in a bad mood when we initiate the
use of the checklist the first time, then I won’t be
bothered with it anymore, it affects me as well, and it is
so incredible fatiguing. I think to myself,” well, well,” and
I leave it [the checklist] aside, and I simply let it be!”
Another example described was a surgeon who
initiated the surgical procedure without getting involved
in and simply ignoring the use of the checklist.
“Well, if this is how it is going to be during the first
scheduled surgery, I’m telling you quite honestly that
the checklist ”will be forgotten” in the next scheduled
surgery. I will not be bothered! It creates
dissatisfaction, and an unpleasant mood in the OR!”
Under the influence of these barriers, in order to obtain
professional and social acceptance within the team, the
nurses strategically tried to reduce the negative atmos-
phere in the OR. This was done by primarily avoiding
drawing negative attention towards themselves by
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nication, strategically positioning themselves in the OR to
avoid disturbances. As a result, the checklist was initiated
in an imprecisely vague manner, thus making it difficult to
follow. Instead of committing themselves to the team, they
awaited other team members’ social or professional initia-
tive. Temporarily, they chose to prioritize and perform
their professional task work. Uncertainty due to lack of ad-
ministrative guidelines and limited time available also
caused a random use of the checklist. This was prominent
during the presence of patients awake in the OR, espe-
cially before administrating anesthesia, but also when per-
forming the rest of the checklist when the patient received
local anesthesia. In these situations, the nurses were wor-
ried that the patients might become anxious when embed-
ded risks of anesthesia were expressed aloud by the team.
The nurses also had concerns that patients who were ner-
vous or needed close attention might feel left alone while
the health care personnel concentrated on the checklist.
However, the limited usage of the “Sign In” part of the
checklist seemed more as an oversight than an intentional
action. This was due to the lack of consensual guidelines,
as expressed by one of the nurses:
“. . .rotation at the ward, being away from it [the
checklist] for such a long time, it’s something we don’t
do all the time, and we simply forget. It is not a
routine yet, not at all, if you ask me!”
A limited team involvement was the consequences of
the nurses’ distancing strategies used to obtain profes-
sional and social acceptance within the team, under the
influence of the conditions described when using the
checklist.
Moderating team involvement
Conditions of this strategy were mainly pragmatic and
were characterized by concurrent tasks, differences in the
nurses’ daily work pattern causing different priorities, yet a
willingness to get involved in the team. The nurses seemed
to have several competing duties to perform; preparing the
surgical equipment, preparing the operating table, prepar-
ing for anesthesia; preparing medications and IV fluids,
getting the patient to the OR on time, and getting the
patient prepared for anesthesia. The nurses were also very
conscientious as to their professional duties, and to what
extent the checklist might be improved to ease their daily
work tasks. They suggested several issues to be added to
the checklist, although they were specific about not making
the list too long. Suggestions made were questions about
infectious diseases and implants (such as pacemakers),
which were likely to require specific preparations. A pre-
induction checklist [10] was already in use on the premises,
which included some of the questions in the WHO’schecklist. The pre-induction checklist was carried out prior
to the WHO’s checklist, and the nurse anesthetists there-
fore suggested to combine the two checklists.
In order to obtain social and professional acceptance
from the team the nurses sought attention by approaching
the team by exchanging information considering the
patient and the scheduled procedure. Strategies used were
questioning specific issues like administration of antibio-
tics or other medications, or the use of certain instru-
ments if the written information was unclear. The nurses
were clear about the potential of the checklist as a
reminder to ensuring that existing routines and guidelines
were followed when planning for a surgery, in addition to
illuminate lack of such routines. This was evident with the
following example of drug administration:
“. . .you have to ask for it, [type of medication]
otherwise it won’t be given! It doesn’t automatically
follow the patient, so if I didn’t know any better, it’s
not guaranteed that the patient would have received
the intended dosage!”
A rationalized approach was also used by the nurse
anesthetists and OR nurses individually during the sur-
gery. This was done to secure information concerning
their specific professional needs even though this im-
plied that information beneficial to the others was not
said aloud. The timing aspect was also of importance
when moderating their team involvement. This was due
to the daily OR logistic.
“. . .the most useful information on the checklist is the
length of the surgery. If the operation is scheduled for
two hours, and the surgeon announces that the
operation will endure for four hours, then I have
received useful information! Or if he announces the
opposite, this will take only one hour. Then I have
gained information from the checklist that I wouldn’t
have received otherwise!”
It was obvious that the nurses considered the checklist
as most useful when its use provided them with infor-
mation which they wouldn’t have received otherwise.
Thus, in order to obtain social and professional accept-
ance from the team, the nurses rationalized their team
involvement according to their practical and-or profes-
sional needs. This was done mainly by selecting when
and to whom they got involved with in the multidiscip-
linary team even though this strategy didn’t involve the
entire team.
“. . .when the surgeon finishes the procedure, we always
speak up loud: the number of sponges and instrument
are OK! We state this very clearly, to the surgeon. . . if
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and it has been controlled many times before- two
times verbally, and two times electronically”
Their strategies were also related to challenging the
barriers in the OR, rather than avoiding them. A
selected team involvement was thus the consequence of
the nurses’ moderating strategies used to obtain profes-
sional and social acceptance within the team, under the
influence of the conditions described when using the
checklist.
Engaging team involvement
The dominant condition in this strategy was the nurses’
experience of a positive and respectful attitude towards
one another within the surgical team, including the
utilization of the checklist. A sense of respect and recog-
nition among the team members seemed to already
exist. This was seen through a positive response from
the team when reviewing the different parts of the
checklist, and the nurses reported this as a motivation
for their team involvement. Less experienced nurses also
emphasized the benefits they automatically gained from
utilizing the checklist, compared to more experienced
nurses.
“In my opinion, the checklist has been very useful for
me as a novice! I get information about the scheduled
surgery and its implications. Such a debriefing before
we start has been of great importance!”
The nurses also perceived the checklist as being mean-
ingful in itself, thus by using it they were contributing to
quality improvements in the OR. Increasing the patient
safety through participating in and coordinating the
utilization of the checklist on a daily base, was consid-
ered an important work. The strategies used when en-
gaging team involvement seemed therefore reliant to the
nurses’ awareness of their own professional role; both as
specialized trained nurses and as checklist coordinators.
Their professional attitude also influenced the strategies
they used. This involved taking leadership through re-
quiring attention from the team. This was done verbally
by speaking out loudly to the rest of the team, and non-
verbally by strategically positioning themselves to get the
team members attention.
“Personally, I don’t think this has been a problem at
all! [utilization of the checklist] I grab the checklist,
and announce: TIME OUT! And I speak clearly and
aloud, and I don’t give up until I get an answer! . . .If
the surgeon ignores the checklist. . .we have to ignore
them! We [checklist coordinators] have to take
control!”Although resistance was detected, this was not a prob-
lem, as it was ignored. The nurses seemed to take con-
trol of the checklist utilization by coordinating and
structuring the information exchange, speaking out
clearly and aloud, from a central position in the OR.
If the surgeons were impatient during the utilization
of the checklist, to draw attention toward themselves
(and the checklist) the scalpel was sometimes hidden
until the “Time-Out” had been completed. During the
utilization of the checklist, the coordinator sometimes
had to pursue the surgeon in order to get attention. This
implied a prolonged “Time-Out” session. This was a
concern to the nurses. Even though the checklist was
completed, it was too time-consuming, implying a risk
of losing the team members attention.
“If you’re doing the “Time-Out”, it should be a real time
out! Everybody should stop and pay attention to the
checklist. If everything is all right then we can go on!”
By engaging team involvement the nurses were positive
about using the checklist and taking control of the coordin-
ation while making improvements suggestions. Thus,
obtaining social and professional acceptance from the team
was gained by utterly initiating their team involvement by
taking responsibility for team actions included the checklist.
The consequence was thus an unlimited, interdiscip-
linary team involvement, with an embedded focus on
prioritizing and using the checklist as intended.
Discussion
Findings describe nurse anesthetists’ and OR nurses’ pre-
requisites to the utilization of WHO’s Safe Surgical Check-
list including patterns of behaviors and consequences
determining checklist compliance, and how the checklist
was used. Three main patterns of behavior emerged cor-
relating to the practical, social, and professional conditions
involved in the OR; distancing, moderating, and engaging
team involvement. However, these strategies must not be
seen as phases in a progressive process, but more as pat-
terns, reflecting the present sociocultural and practical
work environment. This implies that the nurses might
change their strategy during the day according to condi-
tions such as team compositions, or competing task work.
Different strategies might also occur simultaneously due
to the nurses being present in the OR and their individual
perceptions of the conditions involved. The nurses’ main
concern in relation to the surgical team was however not
linked directly to the utilization of the checklist involved,
but as how to obtain social or professional acceptance
within the team in general. The checklist seemed to be
merely one occasion where that issue had arisen. In order
to get involved in and within the surgical team, thus taking
on the responsibility to perform the WHO’s checklist as
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sional acceptance within the team. This was obtained by
the three particular patterns of behaviors as mentioned,
which we have conceptualized as “adjusting team involve-
ment”. This adaptive strategy indicates that the checklist
itself does not work as a tool to optimize communication
patterns and collaborative work processes, and further en-
hancing patient safety as intended. However, through the
utilization of the checklist key issues in team collaboration
that were currently invisible to team members and seemed
integrated as part of the culture, were made visible. In this
section we highlight the safety relevance of adjusting team
involvement.
Task work and teamwork
A combination of elements related to both task work
and teamwork are incorporated in the checklist.
Whereas task work refers to behaviors that are related to
task execution, such as the interaction with medical
equipment- and instruments, teamwork is about how
team members organize their joint actions [8]. Factors
involved in teamwork include designating roles, deter-
mining the timing of activities, coordinating action, and
managing interpersonal factors such as decision making
and conflict resolution [18]. Thus, team involvement can
be seen as the active or passive strategies which mem-
bers of a team perform, unconsciously or not, in order
to join in the team, either socially, or professionally. In
our study the dominating barriers to intentional use of
the checklist were lack of consensus guidelines, resist-
ance within the team, uncertainty, and competing task
work. As many of the issues addressed in the checklist
seemed to be incorporated in pre-existing procedures
performed by the nurses, when barriers were perceived,
these work tasks were performed and accounted for re-
gardless of the checklist. One example was checking the
patient’s identification and use of medications prior to
surgery. The conceptualized strategy of “selecting team
contact” was used when the nurses made arrangements
of information exchange within their own group, instead
of involving themselves in the team, thus confirming this
information aloud to all the team members by utilizing
the checklist. Duplication of existing processes covering
items in the checklist, clashing clinical priorities to per-
forming “time out”, ambiguity about the response sys-
tems, lack of communication between the surgeon and
the anesthetist, time consumption, general communica-
tion problems, hierarchical team culture and tribal
affiliations of members, have also been described as bar-
riers to intentional use in other studies [19,20]. Add-
itionally, concerns about the legal implications of signing
the checklist as being held accountable for errors, have
also been expressed by nurses in the OR elsewhere. [19].
Furthermore, a poor use of the checklist has also showna potential to deepen existing cultural divisions and fur-
ther fray inter-professional dynamics [12], in addition to
giving a false sense of security and compromising safety
and teamwork [9]. In order to deal with and overcome
logistical, structural and cultural barriers towards check-
list utilization, the recognition of its utility, as described
by Lingard and colleagues, [21] is of crucial importance.
This model describes a causal pathway where team
members can be seen to move from sharing information,
to identifying a problem that threatens the safety of care,
to decision- making to resolve that problem, and finally
to follow-up actions to enact the new plan [21]. How-
ever, even though nurse anesthetists and OR nurses
seemed to have a loyal attitude towards the checklist
considering their task work, they adjusted their team-
involvement according to practical, social and profes-
sional conditions in their work environment. This indi-
cates that logistical and structural barriers are inferior to
the cultural barriers. Thus, to improve safety culture in
the OR, interventions should aim at minimizing the
hierarchy and empower nursing staff, in addition to
standardizing and structuring the practicalities concern-
ing the utilization of the checklist. Such initiatives need
to be carried out by the OR management.
Safety culture in the OR
The working culture of an organization has been
described as “analogous to the personality in the individ-
ual”, with the embedded complex pattern of beliefs,
values, attitudes, norms and unspoken assumptions of
all the people that behave and work together [22]. Even
though the OR culture may be hard to define and meas-
ure, the culture may lead to different expressions. This
can be measured by patterns of communication and
team cooperation, such as utilizing the checklist. As seen
in our study, adjusting team involvement was a response
both to structural conditions such as lack of consensus
guidelines, and cultural conditions such as communica-
tion difficulties. Furthermore, the behavioral patterns of
adjusting team involvement were linked directly to col-
laborative processes.
Even though patterns of communication in the OR are
known to be complex and socially motivated [23], the
aim of the checklist is nevertheless to reinforce accepted
safety practices and to foster better communication and
teamwork between clinical disciplines. However, discrep-
ancies in perception of teamwork are known to exist in
the OR. Interdisciplinary diversity in teams contributes
to complex interpersonal relations [24]. Nurses often
describe good collaboration as having their input
respected, whereas physicians often describe good col-
laboration as having nurses who anticipate their needs
and follow instructions [25]. This correlates with the
findings in our study where the nurses limited their
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themselves, when the coordinating of the checklist was
met with resistance within the team. Even though issues
concerning the patient safety were compiled into the
checklist, deficiencies in responding to questions in the
checklist were seen. This indicates that the real chal-
lenges to utilizing and to fully realizing the benefits of
the checklist are cultural. As the core element of patient
safety work implicates an understanding of situations which
might lead to adverse events, it is important to realize that
the implementation of the checklist will require an adaptive
solution. Expecting that a straight forward technical solution
will solve an adaptive, cultural problem is too simplistic.
Therefore, the safety checklist will be of little value if disrup-
tive attitudes and behaviors are not addressed [26]. In a
safety perspective, root cause analysis have revealed that ad-
verse events often are caused by failure to fully appreciate
how one profession’s competent performance is dependent
on the other’s [4], and that the perception of safety being
about individual competence which persists as a standard
and expectation in the healthcare field [21]. As seen in our
study, the nurses downgraded the intentional utilization of
the checklist by avoiding negative attention, awaiting team
initiative, and selecting focus as to whom they got involved
with in the team, and which questions they addressed in the
checklist as part of adjusting their team involvement. A dis-
crepancy in experiences of a team briefing has also been
described by Lingard and colleagues [21]. Whereas the
nurses reported an appreciation of the additional informa-
tion provided them via the briefings, the surgeons perceived
the provision of information negatively [21]. A lack of
awareness of other professionals’ roles and need for infor-
mation to meet the required expectations of the surgery,
might explain this lack of team collaboration. A significant
discrepancy between the surgical team members regarding
their perception of communication, teamwork, and situation
awareness, has also been found in a study by Wauben and
colleagues [23]. Surgical team members’ constructions of
other professions’ roles, values and motivations also seem to
vary with those professions’ constructions of themselves
[27,28]. All team members have a tendency to overrate their
own understanding of colleagues’ role in the OR, and this
was especially marked for the surgeons [28]. However,
novices’ echoing such role simplification has implications
for their professional identity formation, and might also in-
fluence their attitudes towards checklist use.
As found in our study, the nurses’ main challenge was
how to obtain social and professional acceptance within the
team. As the lack of such basic interpersonal skills and re-
spect of different professional’s roles has been identified as
causes for compromised communication [29], an under-
standing and respect of each other’s roles in multidisciplin-
ary teams should be part of the curriculum for both nurse
and medical students. Education as central to changingculture and increasing understanding among interdisciplin-
ary team members has also been described by Gillespie and
colleagues [24]. In a Cochrane review such an interprofes-
sional education has produced positive outcomes in collab-
orative team behavior and reduction of clinical error rates
for emergency department teams [30].
Strengths and limitations of the study
Implementing the WHO’s checklist implies a change for the
people involved. Grounded theory methodology developed
by Glaser and Strauss, 1967 with an embedded focus on
human action and interaction [15-17] is well suited for stud-
ies of peoples’ responses to change. Although all interviews
were uni-disciplinary, reflecting exclusively the views of the
nurse professionals involved, the combination of
homogenous- and mixed groups, complemented each other.
The quality of the data was thus considered rich enough to
achieve variation, saturation, thus maintaining depth in the
analysis. The interviewer’s interest in the checklist and im-
plementation process was clear to the participants, and the
interviewer also had pre-existing work relationship with
some of the participants. This might have influenced the
nurses’ responses which additionally might have been inter-
preted as being somewhat biased because of the lack of
medical representation. However, in addition to the inter-
viewer’s similar professional background, this facilitated the
discussion.
Assessing the quality of grounded theory requires analyz-
ing the criteria of fit, work, relevance and modifiability
[15-17] and it is supportive of the theory of adjusting team
involvement that emerged from our data. The theory also
seems relevant to the strategies conducted by the nurses in
the OR. As for the concept of modifiability, the theory of
adjusting team involvement might well adapt to changes
when new data emerge. This is yet to be seen, thus more re-
search on the subject is needed. However, empirical data
has shown that lack of awareness and motivation, as well as
perceived external factors, is particularly important bar-
riers to adopting and utilizing evidence based guidelines
[31]. In addition, Mickan et al. have shown in a systematic
review that leakage from guideline publication to
utilization occurs among different specialties, across a
range of recommendations, in different countries and
healthcare systems [32]. The production and dissemin-
ation of evidence based clinical guidelines is not sufficient
to ensure that research evidence gets into practice, as with
the WHO’s Safe Surgery Checklist. As for the nurses
involved in our study utilizing the checklist as intended
seemed to be part of an existential challenge; obtaining so-
cial or professional acceptance within their team.
Conclusion
Prerequisites for nurses’ patterns of behavior and work
practice in compliance to the WHO’s Safe Surgical
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WHO the checklist provides a tool for two purposes:
enabling consistency in safety for patients, and introdu-
cing and maintaining a culture which values achieving it.
However, our findings show that within a surgical team,
obtaining social and professional acceptance within the
team seems to be of crucial importance for nurses to in-
volve themselves in the team and fully participate in the
performance- and use of the checklist. Even though
nurses seem to have a loyal attitude towards the WHO’s
checklist regarding their task work, they adjusted their
surgical team involvement according to practical, social
and professional conditions in their work environment.
This resulted in an incomplete use of the checklist and
therefore a low compliance rate. Findings also empha-
sized the importance of management support when
implementing WHO’s Safe Surgical Checklist, and a
team–based approach to local adaptation of the check-
lists use. Building expectations of performance standards
into work processes, when introducing the WHO’s “Safe
Surgical Checklist”, might contribute to improve the cul-
ture. Further research should explore strategies to
strengthen social and professional acceptance within the
surgical team in order to improve team involvement.
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